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.
THE CONTINUING SAGA OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP: THE 
CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT 
Martha McCarthy* 
The values behind the First Amendment make the costs that accompany 
free expression worth bearing, but where children are concerned, the 
benefits are not as strong and the costs are greater. 1 
Since 1996, Congress has enacted several measures designed to 
protect children from exposure to harmful materials over the Internet 
and to punish those who send such materials or allow children to access 
them. Legal conflicts over these laws have pitted First Amendment rights 
to express views and receive information against governmental 
obligations to ensure the well being of minors. The tension between these 
important interests has generated volatile legislative debates and 
numerous court cases, including several Supreme Court decisions.2 This 
article explores the competing values at stake and various legislative and 
judicial efforts to balance them. Particular attention is given to the 2004 
Supreme Court decision regarding the Child Online Protection Act3 and 
to issues that remain unresolved since this ruling. 
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Since the 1990s, Congress has exhibited concern about minors being 
exposed to harmful materials via the Internet, given the ease of 
communication through cyberspace. In 2000, there were approximately 
*Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University 
1. Kevin Saunders, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults? The Need 
for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 257,270 (2004). 
2. These controversies pit liberal and communitarian philosophies against each other. For a 
discussion of this topic, see Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as 
Adults?: Response, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 299, 305-06 (2004). 
3. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft II] (interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 
231 (2004)). 
83 
84 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL l2005 
600 million Internet users across more than 150 countries.4 Indeed, 
Internet sites are doubling annually and include an estimated 100,000 
pornographic sites; new strategies are regularly devised to redirect users 
from legitimate sites to pornographic ones and to make it difficult to exit 
once "kidnapped."5 
One commentator has observed four primary ways by which 
children view inappropriate materials on the Internet. First, "commercial 
actors" may send materials to children through cyberspace.6 Second, 
"child predators either send visual materials or talk with children in ways 
considered harmful."7 Third, minors intentionally locate illicit sites. 8 
And fourth, minors find such sites accidentally.9 Congress has therefore 
attempted several times to curb the ease with which children come into 
contact with obscene material online. 
A. Communications Decency Act 
The first law to generate a Supreme Court decision was the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), enacted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which criminalized the knowing 
transmission of obscene or indecent messages or images through 
telecommunications to recipients under the age of eighteen.10 The CD A 
was not confined to commercial speech or entities; instead it covered all 
postings on individual computers.ll The law stipulated that community 
standards would be used to judge whether materials were indecent. It 
imposed criminal liability on creators as well as transmitters of such 
materials, so schools, libraries, and other institutions that allowed 
children electronic access to such harmful materials were subject to 
liability. 12 
4. Susan Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right! A Summary of Internet 
Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 721, (2004). 
5. See Rebecca L. Covell, Problems with Government Regulation of the Internet: Adjusting the 
Court's Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 777, 777-78 (2000); Kellv Rodden, The 
Children's Internet Protection Act in Public Schools: The Government Stepping on Pa~ents' Toes? 71 
Fordham L. Rev. 2141,2145 (2003). 
6. Todd A. Nist, Student Author, Firzding the Right Approach: A Constitutional Alternative 
for Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 Ohio St. L. ). 451,485 (2004). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. I d. at 486. 
10. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (LEXIS 2004 & Supp. 1996) (In 2003 the act was amended; the former 
description of content that "depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs," was changed to "is 
obscene or child pornography.") Id. § 223(d)(l)(B). 
11. I d. § 223(a). 
12. Id. 
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In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down two CDA provisiOns as 
abridging the First Amendment. 13 The Court reasoned that the law's 
vague provisions pertaining to indecent transmissions and patently 
offensive displays chilled free speech and criminalized some legitimate 
speech for adults. 14 Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Court further 
held that the measures were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest because less restrictive means to shield minors 
from access to inappropriate materials were available. 15 Given that the 
Court struck down these CDA provisions, Congress has enacted other 
measures to shield children from harmful Internet transmissions . 
• q. Children's Internet Protection Act 
In contrast to the CDA, the Children's Internet Protection Act 
( CIP A), signed into law in 2000, focuses on recipients rather than the 
senders of transmissions. 16 It requires public libraries and school 
districts receiving federal technology funds to enact Internet safety 
policies for minors that include the use of filtering measures to protect 
children from access to harmful images. 17 The law does not specify 
particular filters that must be used, and it stipulates that the filters can be 
turned off for adults to engage in research or other lawful activities. 18 
Although the law specifies that local communities are to decide what 
materials are inappropriate for minors, 19 a few major software companies 
actually supply most filters nationally. 20 
Upholding CIP A in 2003, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
American Library Association recognized the latitude Congress has to 
attach reasonable conditions to the receipt of federal funds, as long as the 
conditions do not abridge constitutional rights.21 This standard was met 
13. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
14. /d. at 845. 
15. Id. at 846. 
16 47 u.s.c. § 254 (2004). 
17. hi. § 254(h)(5)( B). CII' A applies to the E-rate Program, which provides discounts on 
telecommunications and Internet access f(Jr eligible schools and libraries, and to the Library Services 
and Technology Act that provides grants for eligible agencies to purchase computers or to pay for 
the direct costs associated with Internet access. SeeN. Y. St. Library, Library Services and Technology 
Act (LSTA) Program, http:/ /www.nysl.nysed.gov/libdev/lsta/lsta04/cipahkgd.htm (accessed March 2, 
2005) or N. Y. St. Library, 10-Ratc (Universal Services .fin Telccormmmications Discounts Program), 
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/lihdcv/univsvc/llprogram (accessed March 2, 2005). 
JR. Id. § 254(h)(5)(D). 
19. Id. § 254(f). 
20. Sec john Berry, The Disarray o( Defeat: There Is a Small Victory .fin Free Access in Our 
CIPA Setback, Library j. (Aug. 15, 20tH), at 8; Kosse, supra n. 4, at 739; Martha McCrrthy, Internet 
Censorship: Values in Conflict, 183 Ed. Law Rep. 299, 307 (20(J4). 
21. US. v. Am. Ub. Assn., 539G.S. 1'!4, 196 (2003). 
since libraries could already adopt filters on their own without 
implicating the First Amendment. The Court rejected the contention that 
the filtering software prevents adult library patrons from gaining access 
to some constitutionally protected expression or abridges libraries' First 
Amendment rights, given that the filters can be disabled for adult 
patrons.22 
Declining to apply heightened judicial scrutiny in reviewing the law, 
a majority of the justices concluded that since libraries can exclude 
pornography from print collections without being subjected to 
heightened scrutiny, they should similarly be able to block online 
pornographyY The Court emphasized that a public library is not 
creating a public forum when it acquires Internet terminals. 24 It is 
providing such Internet access to facilitate learning for research and 
recreational purposes and not to encourage free expression. 25 Although 
this decision applied specifically to the library portions of CIP A, one 
assumes that the rationale would be even stronger to uphold CIPA's 
provisions requiring schools to adopt such protections as a condition of 
receiving federal technology aid. 26 
C. Child Online Protection Act 
The Child Online Protection Act ( COPA) has generated the most 
litigation, including the 2004 Supreme Court decision that will be 
addressed here in some detail. In enacting COPA in 1998, Congress 
attempted to resolve some of CDA's constitutional defects by making 
COPA narrower in scope. COPA prohibits content harmful to minors 
(under seventeen) from being distributed for commercial purposes 
through the T nternetY The commercial limitation is defined in the law 
as those indivtduals "engaged in the business of making such 
communications" in that the persons devote "time, attention, or labor to 
such activities" as part of their trade or business.2x Thus, individuals 
placing materials on the web as a hobby would not be subject to COP A. 
An additional limitation is that COPA targets online communication that 
22. Id. at 208-0'1. 
2.'. Id. at 207 OS. l'our justices, however, indicated that at least heightened ,crutiny should 
have hcen used, and two Df the four, Justices Souter and ( ;inshurg, argued for ,._,tricl scrutiny analy~is. 
!d. at 21'1 (Breyer, I., c·ntKurring); ill. at 220 (Stcvem, )., dissenting); id . • tt 231 (Souter,)., joined k 
(;imburg, j ., disscntlllg). J·or a discussion nf these stan<brds and a more detailed analysis of the AlA 
case, sec :vic< :arthy, supra n. 20, at 299. 
24. ,\Ill. Ub. Am1., 539 U.S. at 195. 
25. ld. 
26. Sec Me( :arthy, supra n. 20. 
27. 47 C.S.C. ~ 23l(a)(l )(d)( I) (2004). 
2~. ld. § 231(cJ(2). 
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is publicly accessible over the Internet and does not target all methods of 
online communication, such as e-mail. 29 COPA imposes criminal and 
civil penalties on those who knowingly make available such materials in 
interstate or foreign commerce.30 The law includes affirmative defenses 
for those who restrict access to prohibited materials by reasonable 
measures such as requiring use of a credit card or adult identification 
number or accepting a digital certificate that verifies age.31 
The law defines materials harmful to minors as "any 
communication" (e.g. picture, image, recording, etc.) that "applying 
contemporary community standards ... and with respect to minors is 
designed to appeal to ... the prurient interest; depicts, in a manner 
patently offensive with respect to minors, ... sexual acts or ... contact ... 
; or taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors."32 This standard is adapted from one applied by the 
Supreme Court in 1973 to determine whether materials are considered 
obscene and thus outside the protective arm of the First Amendment. 33 
II. LITIGATION PERTAINING TO COPA 
Litigation challenging the constitutionality of COPA was initiated in 
1999.34 The district court granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning 
that the law would place a burden on some protected expression.35 The 
court did not find evidence that COPA's criminal penalties for 
distributors of the targeted materials constituted the least restrictive 
means available to achieve the government's goal of restricting minors' 
access to harmful communication via the Internet.36 On appeal, the 
2'1. lhe prohih11cd matcrialmllq be placed on the World \Vide Web "using hn,trtext transfer 
protmol or,m: successor protocol." '!7 U.S.C. §231(c)(1). 
311. 47 l 1.S.L. ~ 231. Amon[( other things, (( lPA imposes a $50,000 fine and six months in 
prL...,nn fnr knowing u>mmcrcial posting of such <..~_,Jacnt. There also have been legislative efforts to 
c urt,;il the .spread of child pornography via the Internet. Sec Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
l.S. 231 (2002) (striking down the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, lH L:.S.C. § 2251 
(2\100). that prohibited the distribution of virtual child pornography, finding no actual harm to 
children bcc,lil'l' no "real" children were used). Sec Kosse, supra n. ·1, at 760~64 . 
.11. -17L:.s.c~211(c)(Ii 
12 ld ~ 2.\1(e)(6) . 
.1.1. S,-c· ,\Iiiier 1'. 1"11/if(nni<l, 413 l.S. 15, 2·1 (1'!73) (holding that the basic guidcline.s frn tnal 
L<lltrh lo u:-.L' in idL·ntlf)·ing unprotcdcd obscene rnakrial arc: "(a) whether 'the a\Tl\lgt' ptT.son, 
.lpph 111g contc·mpor;uy c"<>mmunity standarch' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the· prmient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive w.ry, .sexual 
conduct 'i'c·cific.dly defined hy the applicable stale law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
L1Lk'> .... criou-., literary, arli:-.lic, political, or scientific Yaluc"). 
_11. \,·,· ,\ Lf(l 1'. linw, 31 1'. ~upp. 2d 473 (F. D. i'.L 1 9'19). 
-"· Id. at l'J'i . 
.16. [,/.at ·1'!7. 
00 D.I.U. LlJU~~ llVl'< ~l'<lJ L~ VV JVUKl'<~L LLUU:J 
Third Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting the preliminary injunction, recognizing that an injunction can 
be issued only after considering the following factors: 
(l) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success 
on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed by 
denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in 
even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting 
the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.37 
But the Third Circuit used a different rationale to justify the 
injunction. The appeals court concluded that COP A's use of community 
standards made the law unconstitutionally overbroad in that distributors 
would have to gear messages to the most conservative community to 
satisfy this requirement.38 
Reviewing the appeals court's ruling, the Supreme Court rendered its 
first COPA decision in 2002.39 The Court concluded that COP A's use of 
community standards to identify harmful materials does not render the 
law unconstitutionaliy overbroad.40 But the Court remanded the case for 
reconsideration of other grounds on which COPA could be found 
unconstitutional.41 
Again enjoining the enforcement of COPA, the district court focused 
on the argument that there were less restrictive ways to achieve the 
government's goal-mainly using filtering devises-and that the 
government did not prove that these alternative methods were not 
effective. On remand, the Third Circuit once more affirmed the district 
court's injunction on the enforcement of COPA.42 The appeals court 
used the strict scrutiny standard and concluded that the law likely 
violated the First Amendment on two grounds. First, the court held that 
COP A would probably not be considered narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest in that it is not the least restrictive 
means to prevent minors from using the Internet to gain access to 
harmful materials.43 Second, the appeals court reasoned that COPA 
would likely be found overbroad because it places significant burdens on 
web publishers' dissemination of protected speech and on adults' access 
37. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, 
Inc., 171 !'.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg/. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 
1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d C:ir. 1996))). 
38. 217 1'.3d at 166. 
39. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) [hereinafier Ashcroft I]. 
40. I d. at 5H5. 
41. !d. at 602. 
42. ACI.U v. Ashcroji, 322 F.3d 240,251-66 (3d Cir. 2003). 
43. I d. at 251-6G. 
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to such speech.44 The government then again appealed the Third 
Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court. 
A. Supreme Court Majority Opinion in Ashcroft II 
Addressing COPA a second time in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Supreme 
Court in 2004 affirmed the Third Circuit's conclusion that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by entering the preliminary 
injunction.45 The Supreme Court reiterated that to grant such an 
injunction, the trial court must conclude that the plaintiffs are likely to 
prevail on the merits of their claim and held that the plaintiffs had 
satisfied this standard.46 However, the Supreme Court's five-to-four 
decision was narrower than the Third Circuit's ruling. The majority 
focused on the likelihood that the statute burdens "some speech that is 
protected for adults."47 The Court reasoned that it was important to let 
the injunction stand pending a full trial because of the potential harm in 
chilling protected speech that could result from prosecution of 
distributors of Internet materials under COPA.48 The Court concluded 
that COPA likely violated the First Amendment because it imposes a 
content-based restriction, noting that "the Constitution demands that 
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid."49 
While continuing the injunction and suggesting that filters would be 
less restrictive of First Amendment freedoms than criminal sanctions to 
achieve the legitimate governmental objective of protecting children, the 
Court did not completely shut the door regarding the constitutionality of 
COPA. The majority held that a remand was appropriate for additional 
proceedings regarding the effectiveness and reliability of filtering 
software.50 In remanding the case, the Court indicated that it would be 
possible, although not likely, for the government to meet its burden of 
showing that COP A is necessary for Congress to accomplish its goal of 
safeguarding children from harmful materials via the Internet. 51 
The key question on remand will be "whether the challenged 
regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective 
alternatives."52 The central alternative considered by the district court 
44. Id. at 266-71. 
45. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2787. 
46. Id. at 2791. 
47. I d. 
48. Id. at 2787. 
49. I d. at 2788. 
50. I d. at 2787. 
51. I d. 
52. I d. at 2791. 
was blocking and filtering software, and the Supreme Court majority 
noted that filters may be more effective than criminal penalties Cor 
several reasons. First, filters "impose selective restrictions on speech at 
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source."51 Second, 
adults may gain access to constitutionally protected speech that might be 
viewed as harmful to minors by turning off the filter on home computers 
or requesting that filters be turned off on library computers.~ 1 In 
addition, filters can be applied to e-mail as well as the World Wide 
\Neb,55 whereas COP A's sanctions do not extend overseas.'6 In essence, 
operators who would be threatened with criminal penalties in this 
country could simply move pornographic operations overseas and avoid 
criminal penalties under COPA. Also, the majority recognized that the 
technological landscape had substantially changed since the district court 
made its findings of fact five years earlier, so perhaps now filters are even 
less apt to overblock or underblock sites.57 Finally, requiring the use of 
credit cards to access the material may not keep minors away as 
envisioned, because some minors have such cards. 5 ~ 
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that Congress is not 
authorized to legislate filtering software, noting that "fillers are part of 
h I "s9 I f- d l S c· ' t e current regu atory status quo. · t re erre to t 1e , upremc "ourt s 
2003 decision upholding the Children's Internet Protection Act that 
conditions certain federal aid on public libraries and ~chools adopting 
filtering software.h0 The Court majority also recognized that Congress 
has the authority to enact laws that promote the use of filters by 
parents. ()J 
The Court applied strict scrutiny in deciding that the injunction 
should remain in effect since this was a content-based speech restriction 
akin to one that the Court had invalidated in United Stales v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group. 62 In Playboy Entertainment Group, the adult 
entertainment company challenged part of the Telecommunications Act 
53. I d. at 27'12. 
5,4-_ Id. 
55. /d. at 2793. 
56. The Court also cited the 1\cport of the Commission 011 Child Online l'rot,·dlon to Con,;n·s·; 
indicating that filters are nHHt.' effective than age-verification requirements. Thus, the go\'t..T1lllh'llt\ 
own con1n1i~sion seems to refute the assertion that COPA 1s the lca:-.t restrictive alkrnati\'c . .4slicTo/f 
11, 124 S. ( :t. at 2792-93. 
5/. I d. at 27H7. 
5H. I d. at 27H6. 
5lJ. !d. at 2793. 
60. Sec Am. Lil>. Assn., 539 U.S. 19·1. 
61. Ashcroft 1/, 121 S. Ct. at 27'!3. 
62. ''29 U.S. ~03 (2000). 
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of 1996 (Section 505) that required cable companies to fully scramble 
sexually-oriented programming or limit their transmissions to between 
10 p.m. and 6 a.m. when children would not likely be watching.<;:; The 
"full scrambling" requirement was designed to address signal bleed 
(either audio or visual portions of the scrambled programs might be 
heard or seen).64 The Court ruled that these requirements abridged the 
first Amendment because of the effective less restrictive alternative of 
households ordering signal blocking. Such targeted blocking allows the 
government to support parental authority without denying adult 
speakers and willing listeners their First Amendment Rights. 65 The 
Ashcroft II majority felt that the similar content-based aspect of COPA 
implicated the first Amendment and therefore merited strict scrutiny. 
The Court in Ashcroft II was not persuaded that COP A's application 
to only commercial communication reduced the law's constitutional 
defects. 66 In addition, the majority recognized that the legal landscape 
had changed since the case was initiated because two other federal laws 
had been enacted in the interim, perhaps reducing the need for COPA. 
Congress passed a prohibition on adopting misleading Internet domain 
names to prevent web site owners from disguising pornographic sites.67 
Also, it enacted a law creating a second-level Internet domain, "kids.us," 
which has content that is restricted to appropriate material for minors 
under age thirteen. 6H The justification for COPA's criminal sanctions 
may not be as great as when the law was passed in 1998. 
B. Ashcroft II Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred with the Court 
majority that other methods, such as filtering software, would serve 
congressional interests in protecting minors from sexually explicit 
materials as well as or better than COP A's content-based restraint on the 
dissemination of constitutionally protected speech.69 He further argued 
that criminal sanctions were inappropriate because the line is not clear 
between offensive and protected communications, and he voiced 
uneasiness with using criminal regulation as "a substitute for, or a simple 
63. /d. al H06. 
64. /d. 
65. !d. al i\07. 
66. See intra n. 13H and accompanying text. 
67. I H U.S.C.A. § 2252B (West Supp. 2004). 
6H. Saunders, 3upra n. I, at 25H; see also Llot Kids Implementation and E/!iciemy Act o/2002, 
47 U.S.(.~ 'HI (2004). 
60. Ashcrofi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, ).,joined by (;insburg, )., concurring). 
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backup to, adult oversight of children's viewing habits."70 
However, Stevens strongly disagreed with the Court's conclusion that 
the contemporary community standards could be used to assess whether 
materials are harmful to minors. 71 He claimed that this would allow the 
least tolerant communities in America to determine what would be "a 
crime to post on the World Wide Web."72 
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O'Connor, dissented in Ashcroft II, arguing that COPA is constitutional 
because it is narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest and is the 
least restrictive means available to further that interest?3 In short, Breyer 
contended that COPA satisfies the strict scrutiny standard?4 He 
concluded that the only significant difference between COP A's definition 
of obscene images and the definition of unprotected, obscene material for 
adults that was articulated in Miller v. California consists of the addition 
of the phrase "with respect to minors."75 He claimed that "material that 
appeals to the 'prurient interests' of some ... adolescents" surely would 
"appeal to the 'prurient interests' of some ... adults as well" and would 
not be protected under Miller?6 Thus, he found nothing in COPA that 
broadens prohibitions beyond what is already considered unprotected 
obscene material. 77 In fact, Breyer asserted that by restricting C0PA's 
limitation of penalties to commercial pornography the statute's 
application is further confined, which reduces the First Amendment 
infringement.78 He conceded that the identification requirements for 
adults have some costs and may deter potential users from viewing 
certain materials for fear of embarrassment?9 Still, he noted that this 
does not differ from the use of filters, required by CIP A, which adults 
must ask to be disabled_Ro 
Justice Breyer also contended that available filtering software simply 
does not solve the problem of protecting children from inappropriate 
materials because it lets some harmful material through, and it costs 
money that not all families can afford. 81 He additionally observed that 
70. !d. at 2797. 
71. I d. at 2796. Sec supra n. 34 and accompanying text. 
72. Id. 
73. /d. at 2797 (Breyer,)., joined by Rchnquist, C.)., and O'Connor,)., dissenting). 
74. Id. at 2797~98. 
75. /d. at 2798~'!9. 
76. /d. at 2799. 
77. I d. at 2800. 
78. /d. at 2799~2800. 
79. Id. at 2801. 
80. Jd. 
81. I d. at 2802. 
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children are not always under parental supervision, and filters depend on 
parents' willingness to enforce use of the software.82 Furthermore, 
Breyer noted that filters overblock some useful and protected materials.s' 
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Breyer's conclusion that COPA is 
constitutional, but he wrote separately to argue that COPA should not be 
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.84 He contended that the commercial 
pornography covered by COPA enjoys less constitutional protection and, 
therefore, does not raise a First Amendment concern.85 With the 
Supreme Court justices thus divided on the issue, the future of Internet 
censorship seems uncertain. 
Ill. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
The U.S. Constitution was not drafted with children in mind, so the 
application of constitutional provisions to children has always been 
troublesome. Protecting freedom of expression often collides with 
safeguarding children's welfare, and the guiding principles to resolve this 
conflict are not always clear. Legislation designed to restrict access to the 
Internet focuses on children primarily as consumers of expression rather 
than as creators and distributors. 86 Often polar positions are offered as 
to whether children should be treated like adult citizens in terms of 
access to Internet sites or whether adults should be treated similarly to 
children in that materials deemed harmful to minors should be restricted 
for everyone. These positions raise sensitive questions, pitting important 
values against each other. When materials are restricted for children, is 
the spillover that burdens adult access to lawful materials too heavy a 
First Amendment price to pay to protect children? Or is a slight 
restriction on adult access worth the gain in protecting children from 
82. !d. 
83. !d. at 2S02 -03. 
84. !d. at 2797 (Scalia, J., diS>enting). 
H5. !d. at 2797. 
H6. A parallel body of law is emerging where students themselves arc the ones placing 
materials on the World Wide Web. and sometimes these strands of litigation overlap. In general, 
be!(m: students can be disciplined by school personnel t(Jr Intcrnl'l postings, courts have required 
evidence that students' personal web sites or other transmissions created at home are libelom, cause 
a school disruption, or in other ways interfere with the management of the school. See e.g, Iluessink 
v. Woodland R-1\-' Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (l·:.n. Mo. 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction 
against suspending a student for posting a homepagc that criticized the school); Killion \'. Frm1klin 
Reg/. Sch. Dist., 136 f'. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that a student's suspension ti1r 
publishing a list with some derogatory statements about the school athletic director violated the l'irst 
Amendment because the expression did nol create a substantial disruption); Emmett v. Kcllt Sch. 
Dist. No. 415, <J2 F. Supp. 2d 10RH (W.D. Wa. 2000) (overturning the suspension of a student t<11· 
creating and posting mock "obituaries," since the website did not actually threaten anyone). 
v. L. u. LLJ U~rt 11Vl.._ 1"\l.._lJ Lf\ VV ) U U Kl\11\L lLlJU:J 
access to harmful pornography and graphic violence? Strong, even 
compelling, arguments can be mounted on both sides. 
The American Civil Liberties Union tends to argue that any 
restrictions on access to Internet materials, which might chill expression 
among adults, should be struck down under the First Amendment.87 
Advocates of this position contend that protected expression does not 
change depending on the recipient of the material. 88 They claim that 
restricting access to protect children has too substantial an impact on 
adults' protected expression. 89 
In contrast, those supporting government restrictions that make it 
difficult for anyone to have access to materials considered pornographic 
or otherwise harmful for minors contend that the protection of children 
trumps the First Amendment rights of adults to send and receive 
information.90 Some conservative citizen groups claim that protecting 
the community from harmful influences is more important than Free 
Speech concerns, because obscene and other detrimental materials 
corrupt our society.91 
Possibly, there is a middle ground between these opposite assertions. 
A more moderate position is that the tension between the two core values 
of encouraging free expression and protecting children can be resolved 
by balancing the interests rather than by having one trump or negate the 
other.92 This stance acknowledges that children can suffer harm from 
Internet transmissions, while at the same time it recognizes the 
importance of adults' free expression rights. 93 But determining how 
these interests should be balanced is a monumental task. 
A. Voluntary Censorship 
Some who feel that the balance should be struck in favor of the free 
exchange of ideas contend that government intervention is not needed to 
protect children because it should be assumed that adults will voluntarily 
protect minors from exposure to pornographic, excessively violent, or 
other detrimental materials. 94 They argue that parents should ensure 
:-17. Hr. of Appellees, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1'196), http://www.epic.org/ 
frce __ spccch/CDA/bwsuit/sup_ct_brief.html (accessed March 2, 2005). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Sec Ashcrofi II, 124 S. Ct. al2798-99 (Breyer,)., dissenting). 
91. Sec Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?: On 
Protecting Children From Speech, 79 C:hi.-Kcnt L. Rev. 3 (2004). 
92. !d. at4. 
93. !d. 
94. Sec Separate Statement of Commissioner c;Ioria Tristani, Federal Communications 
Commission, Commission Finds Industry Video Programming Rating System Acceptable: Adopts 
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that their children will not have access to such harmful content by taking 
full advantage of the availability of V -chips 95 and filters to block these 
materials, and of labeling and rating systems for music, television 
programs, and movies. 96 Movies have been rated since the 1960s, but 
ratings of television programs are more recent. The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 specified guidelines for rating television programs and 
established requirements that new television monitors meeting certain 
size specifications must include V -chip technology.97 The law gave the 
television industry a year to enact a voluntary ratings system, which it 
did. After some revisions, the TV Parental Guidelines were accepted by 
the Federal Communications Commission in 1998.98 Strides have been 
made in providing voluntary options to censor various 
telecommunications transmissions, even though additional attention to 
publicizing these strategies is needed to ensure public awareness. 
Much of the attention directed to alternatives to criminal sanctions 
for harmful Internet transmissions has focused on the use of software 
filters that can be installed in a host server and used with a network of 
computers or can be installed on individual computers (as required for 
public libraries and schools to receive federal technology funds under 
CTPA). The software is designed to block sites that have been identified 
as containing the categories of material to be restricted-in this instance, 
material that is harmful to minors. Even if filters are considered the least 
restrictive means to protect children, problems will persist. The criteria 
used by software companies in deciding which sites to block often are not 
transparent, so their congruence with legal standards is difficult to 
ascertain.l)'J Overblocking as well as underblocking are still concerns, and 
questions remain about the ability of filters to block pornographic 
'/ ccllnic<ll nc<[Uircmcnts to L:nu/Jlc Hlocking of Video Programming (the "V-Cilip), !'( :c :\e'" (l'vlarch 
12, l 0%), http:/ /flp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cablc/:--l~ws _Releases/1998/nrcbR003.html (accessed March l 9, 
21l1Li); 
Saunders, supra 11. l, <It 27_"\, 276. 
95. A\' -chip is a feature designed to enable viewers to block the display of all programs with 
specified rating~. 
%. Sec gcucm/lv, Committee to Study Tools and Strategies fN Protecting Kids from 
l'mnography, 1\:ational J(e"'"rch Council, Yout/1, Pornography, and the Intcmct (Dick Thornburgh 
& I krbert Lin ecb., Nat'\ Academics 2002), http://www.nap.edu/html/youth_internct/ (accessed 
\larch 2, 200~). 
Y7. -17 L;.s.c. § 303(x) (2tlll4); see also 47 U.S. C.§ 330 (201l4) 
'Jl:l. Sec Separate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani, supm n. 94. However, the ACLU 
"a' nut sati,fied with the ratings system, contending that these "voluntar:·" measur~s were actually 
g.tJ\'crnmcntally coerced. 
'!9. Sec !'au\ Smith, Frec-Spccc/1 Groups to Filtering Co111panics: Co///c Cimn, J.SUJOOI. :\1.1\'' 
(Aug. 2003 ), at H. 
u.Lu . .c.uu~ .. d"l.l1Vl'll\l'IU LAW JUUKNAL [LUU:J 
pictures that are not accompanied by text. 100 Some new software is 
designed to monitor the content being retrieved rather than to block 
particular sites, which helps with the overblocking and underblocking 
concerns. 101 As noted previously, ideally each community would devise 
criteria for restricting particular sites or content, but in reality software 
developers are usually making these important decisions. 102 
Some commentators have suggested that the problem with minors' 
access to harmful materials in cyberspace could be addressed by Internet 
zoning. Todd Nist has proposed that children can be protected by 
creating a separate x-rated Internet domain (e.g .. xxx) that could be 
accessed only with software purchased with verification of age. 103 This 
approach places the burden on those attempting to gain access to the x-
rated zone rather than on the developers or distributors of the 
materials. 104 Using this strategy, specific material would not be removed; 
instead, certain content would be placed in "a secluded location, off in 
the back, where children cannot go."105 However, given that minors 
might get the necessary software from relatives or others, verifying that 
only individuals of a certain age have access is not as easy as checking 
minors' age before serving them liquor in a restaurant. 106 
Rather than zoning the Internet itself, Amitai Etzioni has suggested 
that a solution might be to have separate computers for children and 
adults. 107 He has noted that there is some precedent in that libraries 
often have separate children's sections and video rental stores have X-
rated sections. 108 But this strategy would not address access to harmful 
materials on home computers, where voluntary censorship by adults 
would still be required. 109 
B. Treating Children and Adults Differently 
Even those asserting that parents should monitor their children's 
100. See Saunders, supra n. 1, at 259. 
101. See supra, n. 96. 
102. See Kosse, supra n. 4, at 739. Where schools are required to adopt filters as a condition of 
receiving federal technology aid and they delegate blocking decisions to software companies, 
questions arise regarding whether schools are delegating their legal authority to determine the school 
curriculum to software companies in violation of state constitutional provisions. See McCarthy, 
supra n. 20, at 307-09. 
103. Nist, supra n. 6, at 481-85. 
104. See id. at 481. 
105. Id. at 490. 
I 06. !d. at 482. 
107. Etzioni, supra n. 91, at 28-29. 
108. Id. at 29. 
109. See id. 
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access to harmful materials concede that some parents are not aware of 
the filters and related technology available to them and that other parents 
are simply not inclined to censor their children's Internet access.U0 The 
question remains: should the government treat children differently in 
terms of legislative protections because they comprise a vulnerable 
group? 
Champions of governmental intervention note the historical 
evidence supporting the differential treatment of children and adults for 
First Amendment purposes. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts the 
Supreme Court found that the government's interests in protecting 
children overrode parents' interests in having their children engage in 
selling religious materials and preaching on public roads. 111 
Subsequently, in Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court recognized 
the governmental responsibility to protect children when it upheld a New 
York law prohibiting the sale of materials deemed to be pornographic to 
minors under age seventeen. 112 In this case, the Court recognized the 
legislative authority to assist parents in ensuring the welfare of children, 
noting that "the concept of obscenity ... may vary according to the group 
to whom the questionable material is directed."113 
Similarly, the Court has upheld the Federal Communications 
Commission ruling that disallows the broadcast of indecent speech when 
children are likely to be listening or watching unsupervised.U 4 Also, to 
settle ongoing litigation, major tobacco companies agreed to terms of a 
settlement that included restrictions on advertisements that appeal to 
children, such as the use of cartoon characters or sponsoring events or 
team sports that have a substantial youth audience. 115 Of course, such 
advertising is commercial speech, which is entitled to less First 
Amendment protection than other forms of expression. 116 
There is a fairly large body of law documenting that children in 
schools are treated differently from adults in applying constitutional 
protections. In the landmark case recognizing that students have 
expression rights in public schools, Tinker v. Des Moines, the Supreme 
110. Seeid.at31-33. 
111. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
112. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 {1968). 
113. Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)). More 
recently, the Fourth Circuit upheld state prohibitions on the display of sexually explicit materials to 
juveniles under eighteen. Amer. Booksellers Assn. v. Va., 882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
494 u.s. 1056 (1990). 
114. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
115. National Association of Attorneys General, Tobacco Settlement Agreement at a Glance, 
http:/ /www.naag.org/issues/tobacco/msa (Nov. 6, 1998) (accessed january 15, 2005). 
116. See e.g. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,64-75 {1983). 
70 lLV\0 
Court nonetheless acknowledged that the school is a special environment 
in terms of First Amendment rights. 117 In subsequent cases the Court 
has recognized that students' expression rights in public schools are not 
coextensive with those of adults in other settings. 11 H For example, the 
Court held in 1986 that lewd and vulgar student expression is not 
protected, even though adults might enjoy First Amendment protection 
for such expression. 119 The Court further held that it is appropriate for 
school personnel to determine what expression is lewd and vulgar and 
thus subject to censorship. 120 
Assuming for the moment that some government intervention is 
needed to protect children and that free expression rights apply 
differently to children and adults, 121 who should decide what is harmful 
for minors, how should this determination be made, and how differently 
should children be treated from adults? If community standards are used 
to determine what materials are harmful, then the category of prohibited 
. l I . . d 127 S h matena s may vary great y across commumtles an states. - orne ave 
argued that using community standards is unworkable, particularly 
involving the Internet, because of the global reach of the transmissions to 
d . . . d . 121 very 1verse commumtles an countnes. · 
However, Justice O'Connor has countered these assertions by noting 
that a national standard is being promoted in terms of values, and this 
standard has been articulated and can be legislated. 124 Justice Breyer 
similarly has argued that "community" refers to the nation's adult 
community taken as a whole rather than to geographic areas. 125 
Agreeing, Etzioni has further observed that 
the very Constitution and its First Amendment that liberals rise to 
defend reflect national values that some communities may well not 
endorse if left to their own devices, but we hardly exempt those 
communities from abiding by it. Of course, Congress is an institution 
authorized to speak for nationwide preferences and values. So is the 
117. 393 u.s. 503,506-07 (196'!). 
II~. Sec generally Hazelwood Sch. District .. 484 U.S. 260 (I<JSS); !lethe/ Sch. /)ist. 1'. Fr<1scr. ·l7K 
U.S. 675 (I 9Ho). 
119. Bethel, -178 U.S. at 6R2-H3. 
120. Sec id. at 685. 
121. Sec Etzioni, supra n. 91, at ·12. 
122. See id. at 50-52. 
123. Sec e.g. Kelly !vl. Doherty, Student Author, ;\n Analysis of Ohscl'llitv and ind,·n·luT 
Regulation on the Internet, 32 Akron L. Rev. 259 (I <)99); Philip E. Lewis, Student Author, ;\ Hrid 
Comment on the i\pplic<ltion of the "Contc111porary C:om111unity Standard" to the lntan.·t, 22 
Campbell 1.. Rev. 143 ( 1999). 
124. Ashcroft I, 535 l;.s. at 587-R9 (O'Connor,)., concurring). 
125. !d. at 5R'J-91 (Breyer,)., concurring). 
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S ( ' 12() c upreme ~ourt. 
While some assume that the use of community standards might 
result in applying restrictive norms of the most conservative geographic 
community to the nation as a whole, the counterargument is that a 
virtual national standard would likely adopt the perspective of the most 
liberal communities. Nist argues that the intent of a national standard is 
not to force one group's values on everyone else; it is to protect 
expression. Thus, "a national standard stops the government from 
restraining expression that the more liberal communities deem to be 
okay; it stops the government from restraining unpopular expression."127 
Even if consensus is reached regarding which community standards 
are applied, determining the contours of expression that are harmful to 
children remains extremely problematic. Using a modified Miller12R 
standard to identify obscene materials does not address how depictions 
of violence would be screened. Indeed, there is more evidence of the 
harmful effects on children of violence than of pornographic materials. A 
group of major professional associations addressing concerns of youth 
documented more than 1,000 studies pointing to a causal relationship 
between media violence and children's aggression. 129 Some research has 
shown a greater impact of the violence in video games than of television 
violence, because of the active and interactive nature of the games. 130 Yet, 
most of the efforts to block Internet transmissions accessible to minors 
have focused on obscenity rather than violence. 131 
Another area of uncertainty pertains to the status of hate speech and 
harassing expression, which can be quite harmful to children. Legislative 
efforts to restrict minors' access to the Internet have not usually 
addressed such expression unless combined with obscenity. 132 
Resistance Records and other groups are currently promoting hate 
speech and music to young people via the Internet, 133 and whether such 
126. l'tzioni, supra n. 91, at 52. 
127. Nist, supra n. o, at 472-73. 
12R. Miller, 413lJ.S. 15. See supra nn. 32-33 and accompanying text. 
129. Am. Acad. ol Pediatrics et al., joint Statement of the Impact of Entcrtaimnent 
\'iobzce 011 Children (July 26, 2000), http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm (cKCcssed 
March 2, 2005); but sec Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children - From Censorship: A Reply to 
Anzitai I.'tzioni, 7lJ Chi.-Kcnt I.. Rev. 229 (2004) (providing a contrary position on the impact of 
media violence). 
130. Sec Craig Anderson and Karen Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and 
lichavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 7R Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 772, 7SR (2000). 
13!. Sec Saunders, supra n. 1, at 262. 
132. Sec J;Cnmzlly 47 U.S. C.~ 231; 47 U.S. C.~ 223. 
133. Anti-Defamation League, Deafening Hate: The Revival of Resistance Records, 
http://www.adl.org/rcsistanccrecords/summary.asp (2000) (accessed March 2, 2004). 
sites would be blocked with current filters is ambiguous. 
If agreed that children deserve special governmental protection, 
questions still remain regarding whether all minors should be treated in 
the same manner. The term "minor" as used by Congress in COPA refers 
"in a literal sense to an infant, a five-year old, or a person just shy of age 
seventeen." 134 But the government in defending COPA has argued that 
"minors" are older adolescents who may be capable of possessing a 
prurient interest. 135 The key consideration is whether there should be 
categories of minors, with greater protections for younger children. Very 
young children can easily surf the Internet and inadvertently be exposed 
to harmful materials with a few wrong clicks. Some advocate an age-
differentiated approach with children twelve and under receiving greater 
protection than teenagers between ages thirteen and seventeen. 131i An 
age and content-based system would shield younger children from 
certain materials and would protect older minors (teenagers) from access 
tr to other types of Internet speech. · 1 
Questions also remain regarding how differently to treat commercial 
expression. Traditionally, commercial expression has enjoyed some 
constitutional protection, but not the same level as afforded speech 
intended to convey a particular point of view. 13s The drafters of COPA 
attempted to address the CDA's defects by restricting COPA sanctions to 
commercial purposes, but this restriction did not satisfy the courts that 
COPA should pass constitutional scrutinyY9 In fact, the Third Circuit 
concluded that this limitation did not narrow the reach of COPA 
sufficiently because the law's provisions went beyond commercial 
pornographers to any communication for commercial purposes even if 
distributors do not make a profit from such material. 1 10 Whether 
commercial restrictions could be drafted to satisfy the First Amendment 
is still not clear. 
l.l.f. ,\(."[.[.', 322 F.3d at 256. 
135 !d. at 253. 
13Cl. See Ftnoni, supra n. <Jl, at-12-•17. 
137. Sec id. at •13--17; sec also Dawn Nunziato, flo Children Have the Same First Amendment 
/l.ig!Jts As Adult.1 7: ·rowanl '' Constitutional /l.cgulatio11 of Minors' Access to Harm/ill i11temet Speech, 
79 Chi. Kent I.. Rn. 121,121-22 (200·!). 
131\. Sec e.g Rd. of Fmste,•s v. Fox, .J<J2 U.S. 469 ( 19K<J) (finding that government restrictiom on 
commercial speech do not have to be thr least restricti\·e mean-"> to achieve the dc.-,ircd govcrnrncnt 
goal; thL'IT simply needs to be a reasonable fit between the restrictions and the goal); Holgcr, 463 U.S. 
at M--75 (holding that commercial speech in lcrms or unsolicited mailings is ati(n·ded lc" 
constitutional protection than other l(mns of expression). 
139. Sec generally Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. 27?13 (2004). 
I 10. ACUJ, 322 F.3d at 256. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. ACLU dealt another blow to 
congressional efforts to shield minors from exposure to harmful 
materials over the Internet. 141 But the issues left unresolved are not 
going away, given the mind-boggling growth of cyberspace, which shows 
no signs of dissipating. Increased education is crucial to alert parents and 
others about dangers on the Internet and to encourage all involved to be 
mindful of Internet safety. Also, governmental efforts to regulate the 
Internet, especially access by children, seem destined to continue 
generating legal controversies and moral dilemmas. Some governmental 
protection of children in cyberspace seems necessary, but how much 
protection is allowed by the First Amendment remains elusive. 
141. See generally Ashcroji II, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (20(l4). 
